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BAIL, GLOBAL JUSTICE, AND THE
LIMITS OF DISSENT©
BY JACKIE ESMONDE"
This article examines the ways in which the law of
bail has been used to criminalize dissent in Canada.
Three case studies are analyzed to demonstrate how the
law of bail has been applied to those arrested at global
justice demonstrations associated with militant civil
disobedience. The first case study examines the bail
conditions imposed on protesters arrested at anti-ApEc
demonstrations in Vancouver 1997. These bail
conditions were intentionally designed to prevent those
arrested from attending the protests. The second case
study focuses on the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
(OCAP), with an analysis of how the bail system has been
used to criminalize its activism through a combination of
bail conditions prohibiting public protest, pre-trial
detention orders of its leaders, and prohibitions on
association with OCAP. The final case study turns to
arrests at demonstrations against the Summit of the
Americas in Quebec City in April 2001, documenting the
intentional violation of the statutory right to a bail
hearing within 24 hours, and the denial of bail to a
perceived leader of the global justice movement. Viewed
together, these case studies demonstrate that the law of
bail has provided insufficient protections for civil
liberties.
I. INTRODUCTION ..............
Cet article examine comment la loi sur le
cautionnement a servi A criminaliser la dissidence au
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d~montrer comment la loi sur le cautionnement a 6ti
applique aux personnes interpelles ors de
manifestations altermondistes assimil~es A la
d~sob6issance civile militante. La premiire 6tude de cas
examine les conditions de cautionnement impos6es aux
manifestants interpelles lors des manifestations contre
I'ApEC de Vancouver en 1997. Ces conditions de
cautionnement 6taient sciemment dlabores pour
empecher les personnes interpelles de participer aux
manifestations. La deuxi me 6tude de cas s'intiresse A
Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), avec une
analyse de la fagon dont le systime de cautionnement a
tC utilis6 pour criminaliser son militantisme, A travers
un ensemble de conditions de cautionnement qui visent
4 emp~cher les manifestations publiques, des
ordonnances de d6tention avant les pro~s des chefs
militants, et des interdictions d'association avec l'ocAp.
La dernire 6tude de cas vise les arrestations intervenues
lors de manifestations contre le Sommet des Ameriques
A Quebec en avril 2001, et documente la violation
intentionnelle du droit 16gal & une enqu~te de
cautionnement sous 24 heures, et le refus de
cautionnement oppos6 A un pr~tendu chef du
mouvement altermondiste. Consid6r6es ensemble, ces
etudes de cas demontrent que la loi surle cautionnement
n'a pas su convenablement prot~ger les libert6s civiles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Civil disobedience as a strategy of resistance is treated with both
respect and revulsion. Images of resistance from the past are often heaped
with praise and idealized as important fights for freedom, credited with
bringing about progressive social change. The fight to end slavery and the
civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s all used civil disobedience
in order to fight injustice.' At the time that these same movements were
mobilizing, however, the response of the state was often to jail and, on
occasion, to execute dissenters.
The global justice movement of today faces similar contradictions.
This movement is made up of a loose grouping of people who oppose neo-
liberal forms of globalization. A series of massive demonstrations across the
world-in Seattle, Bolivia, Washington, Prague, Quebec City, Genoa, and
Argentina-have successfully placed globalization on the political agenda.
One segment of the movement has used civil disobedience as a tactic for
disrupting the capacity of world leaders to plan the world economy. It has
been met with fierce resistance from the state, through extraordinary
mobilizations of police forces and mass arrests. It has been denounced as
profoundly misguided, criminal, and a threat to democracy.
This article arises out of my own experience in the global justice and
anti-poverty movements. I have participated in many of the major Canadian
global justice demonstrations of the last several years in a variety of
different roles-as a protester, an organizer, and more recently as part of
For an overview of some of the historical movements that have used civil disobedience, see
Martin C. Loesch, "Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience Justification" (1991) 5 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 1069.
Limits of Dissent
a legal support team.2 I have found that rather than seriously engaging with
the arguments put forth by demonstrators, the response of the state has
been to seek protection behind walls of police armed with chemical and
other types of weapons. My experiences have allowed me to assess first-
hand the increasing criminalization of global justice protest, from security
preparations to initial contact with police to the reactions of lawyers and
judges. I have been particularly struck by the role that bail has played in the
criminalization of political expression and activity.
Part II examines the relationship between democracy, the Rule of
Law, and civil disobedience in a liberal capitalist state. I will argue that not
only is civil disobedience compatible with democracy and the Rule of Law,
but it can actually further these principles and thus make an important
contribution to positive social change. Given this contribution, as well as
the protected status given to political expression by the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,3 arrests arising from civil disobedience pose
challenges for lawmakers.
Part III provides a brief overview of the law of bail in Canada,
demonstrating that there is a basic presumption that accused persons will
be released before trial, a presumption that can only be overcome where it
is necessary to forward one of the goals of the bail system. A key goal of the
bail system is the prevention of unlawful activity. I will analyze the
protections provided in the Charter for those arrested at political
demonstrations. I will argue that the jurisprudence does not offer sufficient
protection to political and civil rights, and allows for the significant
curtailment of individual freedoms.
Part IV contains three case studies designed to demonstrate how
the law of bail has been applied to those arrested at global justice
demonstrations associated with militant civil disobedience. The first case
study examines the bail conditions imposed on protesters arrested at the
1997 anti-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) demonstrations in
Vancouver. I will demonstrate that they were intentionally designed to
prevent those arrested from attending the protests. The second case study
focuses on the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), with an analysis
of how the bail system has been utilized to criminalize its activism. This
criminalization has been accomplished through a combination of bail
conditions prohibiting public protest, pretrial detention orders of its
leaders, and prohibitions on association with OCAP. The final case study
2 My organizational affiliations include the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty, Ontario Common
Front, New Socialist Group, and the Common Front Legal Collective.
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter].
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turns to arrests at demonstrations against the Summit of the Americas in
Qu6bec City in April 2001. It will document the intentional violation of the
statutory right to a bail hearing within twenty-four hours and the denial of
bail to a perceived leader of the global justice movement.
When viewed together, these examples show a disturbing trend in
which arrested activists, not yet proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
have had their political activity substantially curtailed. It is not sufficient to
say that tactics such as pretrial detention, restrictive conditions, or the
denial of bail hearings are necessary in order to prevent unlawful activity
at future demonstrations. These tactics limit much more than future civil
disobedience. Lawful and constitutionally protected political expression and
activity are themselves prohibited or prevented. It is difficult to come to any
conclusion other than that the bail system is being used to suppress dissent.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE
GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
A. Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Civil Disobedience
In the abstract, a democratic government is said to express the
interests and will of the people it is elected to represent-the principle of
governance for the people by the people.4 But in order for a government to
speak for its citizens, there must be protections ensuring that those who are
governed can participate in political choices by expressing their wishes or
dissent. Thus liberal democracies have made a commitment to civil rights
such as freedom of speech to guarantee that there are avenues for political
participation. Freedom, equality, and individual liberty are seen as core
characteristics of democracy and, combined with liberal notions of
constitutionality and the Rule of Law, are considered effective protections
against tyranny. Given this commitment to political participation, political
expression that takes the form of unlawful acts may create a conflict
between a state's need to maintain order and its protection of civil liberties.
Some argue that civil disobedience poses an insupportable challenge to the
Rule of Law and that it undermines the democratic decisions made by
representative governments.
However, to ensure that concepts such as the Rule of Law support
democratic principles, they must have some content beyond ensuring that
the law applies equally to all: "Stability and order are not the only desirable
conditions of social life. There is also justice, meaning the fair treatment of
J.S. Mill, On Liberty with The Subjection of Women and Chapters on Socialism, ed. by Stefan
Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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all human beings, the equal right of all people to freedom and prosperity.
Absolute obedience to law may bring order, but it may not bring justice."5
If the judgments at Nuremberg have taught anything, it must be that
the fact that a law exists is not in and of itself sufficient cause to follow it.6
The content of the law or policy must be critically assessed to determine
how it measures up to the fundamental principle of democracy-a
commitment to equality in both a formal and substantive sense.
Classic liberal political theorists who staunchly defend the Rule of
Law, such as John Locke or John Rawls, have argued that disobedience is
justified in a democratic state where the government has failed to fulfill the
conditions of the "social contract."7 Through disobedience to unjust laws,
the protestor calls attention to this failure and demands that it be
addressed. Civil disobedience as understood from this perspective is
remedial, as the reform of the unjust law will mean that the state is once
again relatively democratic and just.' The social contract will be repaired.
This justification underlies the classic definition of civil disobedience: "an
illegal, public, non-violent, conscientiously motivated act of protest, done
by someone who accepts the legitimacy of the legal and political systems
and who submits to arrest and punishment."9
This justification of civil disobedience is applicable only so far as the
state is believed to be democratic and just. Where a democracy is
constituted by political equals, and where the laws express the desires and
needs of the people, there is little reason to disobey those laws. However
it must not be forgotten that democracy is more than a commitment to
individual civil rights. It is also a system by which people are governed: "a
democratic government, like any other, exists to uphold and enforce a
certain kind of society, a certain set of relations between individuals, a
certain set of rights and claims that people have on each other both directly,
and indirectly through their rights to property.'
5 Howard Zinn, "Law, Justice and Disobedience" (1991) 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
899 at 902.
6 Christian Bay, " Civil Disobedience Theory" in Christian Bay and Charles C. Walker, eds. Civil
Disobedience: Theory and Practice (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975) 13 at 30.
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988); J. Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971).
8 The distinction between remedial and constructive disobedience is drawn from Les Green,
"Globalization and Civil Disobedience" (2001) [unpublished].
9 Paul Harris, "Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience" in Paul
Harris, ed., Civil Disobedience (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990) 1 at 2.
10 C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Concord, Ont.: Auausi Press, 1992) at 4.
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In a liberal democracy, which is inextricably tied to capitalism, this
means upholding capitalist social, political, and economic relations. In such
a context, the possibilities and limits of a liberal democracy must then be
assessed from within the possibilities and limits of capitalism itself.
Stripped down to its bare essentials, capitalism requires that the
minority own the means of production, while the majority is required to sell
its labour power in order to survive. On its surface, capitalism may appear
to take the form of a free and equal exchange between property owners.
For some of the classic political economists, such as Adam Smith and Jean
Jacques Rousseau, the protections afforded to private property that make
capitalism possible were closely identified with individual freedom and
equality: every property owner was equal to every other, none had exclusive
access to property, and all were subject to the same rules."1 However, such
equality is undermined where the minority has greater access to private
property than the majority. Rather, equality of form masks the fact that
capitalism by necessity requires great inequality in the content of social
relationships.12
When these social relations are supported, produced, and
reproduced through a liberal state, unequal distributions of resources,
wealth, and access to power are formalized. Thus the possibilities for full
democratic participation and freedom are always limited in a liberal
democracy because the "narrow horizons of bourgeois right and democracy
derive from the material conditions of capitalist production: the
exploitation of the majority by the minority is compatible only with limited
democracy and limited right."' 3 This inequality in a liberal capitalist state
is legitimized by an ideological separation between political and economic
spheres:
Liberal democracy leaves untouched the whole new sphere of domination and coercion
created by capitalism, its relocation of substantial powers from the state to civil society, to
private property and the compulsions of the market. It leaves untouched vast areas of our
daily lives-in the workplace, in the distribution of labour and resources-which are not
subject to democratic accountability but are governed by the powers of property and the
'laws' of the market, the imperatives of profit maximization.'4
B. Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liberal Ideals and Marxist Critiques (London: Pluto
Press, 1984) at 11.
12 Macpherson, supra note 10 at 7.
13 Fine, supra note 11 at 131.
1 4 E. Meiksins Wood,DemocracyAgainst Capitalism: Renewing HistoricalMaterialism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 234.
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The key democratic principles of equality and freedom do not
extend to the regulation of the economic sphere. However this line between
political and economic spheres is subject to historical shifts. For example,
the great defenders of liberalism such as Locke or Albert Venn Dicey never
envisioned the extension of suffrage beyond the class of white, propertied
men. The extension of democratic principles beyond these parameters
resulted from the pressure of masses of people demanding that a
commitment to democratic government be taken to its logical conclusion.
From the abolition of slavery, the dismantling of legislated segregation in
the American South, the establishment of social welfare programs, to the
creation of protections for trade unions, pressure from below has
challenged governments to demonstrate a commitment to substantive
equality.'5 Social movements have done this in a variety of ways, combining
workplace actions, mass mobilizations of people, and civil disobedience.
Thus a second form of civil disobedience emerges--constructive civil
disobedience. 6 Constructive civil disobedience acts on the assumption that
a full democratic and just order does not yet exist, and employs tactics of
resistance that break the law in order to create relations that are
democratic and just.17 Where laws are created by a powerful elite with
disproportionate access to state power, and the laws serve to maintain these
unequal social relations, disobedience may be the only avenue for those
without political power to press for change.
Constructive disobedience thus relies on a different justification for
civil disobedience than that advocated by traditional liberal theorists. This
justification has consequences for the kinds of civil disobedience that can
be justified. For example, under the classic definition, civil disobedience is
limited to non-violent acts for which the offender accepts full punishment.
Such a requirement makes sense where the state is viewed as essentially
legitimate. However these requirements make less sense in the context of
constructive disobedience, which begins with a more critical analysis of the
state.
Where the state is viewed as unjust, and people believe that they
have acted in the interests of justice, there is no compulsion to accept
punishment from the same state that is believed to be illegitimate. 8 For the
P. Rosenthal, "The Toronto Nuclear Weapons Trials: A Look Back to the Future" (1990) 10
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 194 at 220.
16 Green, supra note 8.
17 In practice, the distinction between remedial and constructive civil disobedience is less
apparent. Historically and currently both have occurred, even within the same movement.
18 Zinn, supra note 5 at 915-20.
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same reason, pacifism may not always be appropriate. Violence is a
strategic and tactical question that must be assessed in each context rather
than being dismissed outright: the choice of means should be "rationally
calculated to promote the limited ends."19 Thus where the state engages in
violence in order to protect the unequal distribution of power, violence by
a civil disobedient as self-defence or in order to defend others may be
appropriate. A dogmatic commitment to pacifism can represent
acquiescence to continued violence and oppression.' For these reasons, the
definition of civil disobedience that I use is not confined to the strict limits
of the traditional definition. Civil disobedience is
any act or process of public defiance of a law or policy enforced by established governmental
authorities, insofar as the action is premeditated, understood by the actor(s) to be illegal or
of contested legality, carried out and persisted in for limited public ends, and by way of
carefully chosen and limited means.
21
Thus violence is not excluded from the definition of civil disobedience,
leaving the question of its justification to be determined in each context.
B. The Movement Against Neo-Liberal Globalization
The global justice movement burst into mass consciousness with the
"Battle of Seattle" in November 1999. Over a year's worth of grassroots
organizing brought together more than sixty thousand people, all gathered
to express resistance to the World Trade Organization's (wwo) plans for
the global political economy. Most frequently known as the anti-
globalization movement, there are, in fact, many different constituencies in
this movement with sharp differences of opinion over their analyses of the
issues, appropriate tactics, and best solutions.' Despite these differences,
the movement has continued to grow, presenting challenges to world
leaders wherever they meet to discuss the implementation of neo-liberal
policies.
19 Bay, supra note 6 at 18.
20 1bid. at 28.
21 Ibid. at 15.
22 A great deal has already been published on the protests against the WTO in Seattle 1999.
Interesting articles from the protesters' point of view include: T. Clarke, "Taking on the WTO: Lessons
from the Battle of Seattle" (2000) 62 Studies in Political Economy 7; B. Epstein, "Anarchism and the
Anti-Globalization Movement" (2001) 53 Monthly Review 4; David McNally, "The Quebec City
Protests" (2001) 31 New Politics 76; W. Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: The APEC Affair
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).
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Although there is no unified argument put forth by the global
justice movement, the broad outlines of the critique of neo-liberal
globalization can be sketched. The argument runs along the following lines:
neo-liberalism represents an intensely ideological approach to social and
economic policy, which claims that free markets and free trade are a
solution to global inequality with the capacity to increase wealth for all.2
Activists argue that, in reality, during the last two decades of the neo-liberal
experiment, poverty and inequality have increased both within and between
countries. This is a direct result of massive cuts to social programs,
privatization of services and resources, attacks on workers' rights, and other
staples of the neo-liberal agenda. 4 Through the imposition of aid packages
tied to so-called structural adjustment programs, international economic
organizations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank have
developed enormous power to influence or control outright the economic
and social policies of countries around the world. Free trade agreements
between countries have similar results, resulting in global poverty, job
insecurity, Third World debt, and imperialism.
Activists disagree over several fundamental questions. Social
democratic branches of the movement argue that international trade
agreements and institutions undermine the democratic decision-making
power and the sovereignty of individual states, giving more power to
corporations. Such activists often argue that the addition of social clauses
to free trade agreements is an adequate solution. The more radical
branches of the movement interpret neo-liberal globalization as
representing the current form of global capitalism. They argue that the
problem is not that individual countries are losing power to international
institutions. Rather, it is that the state has shifted its focus to the world
level as decisions at the national level get increasingly tied to the global
movement of capital, accelerating processes of exploitation and oppression.
Despite these differences, there is agreement that neo-liberalism has
increased global inequality on a massive scale, and that the current outlets
for democratic participation in decisions about the global economy are
inadequate. They agree that, in some sense, "democracy is not working."
As the global justice movement has matured, segments of the
movement have seen the links between the global political economy and
their local communities. Many now argue that demonstrations at large
international summits are insufficient and have thrown support behind the
23 Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (London: Verso
Books, 1997) at 120.
24 See e.g., Armine Yalnizyan, The Growing Gap:A Report on Growing Inequality Between the Rich
and Poor in Canada (Toronto: Centre for Social Justice, 1998).
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work of organizations that are fighting the effects of neo-liberal
globalization at the local level. One group in particular that has received a
great deal of support from some segments of the global justice movement
is the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), a militant anti-poverty
group based in Toronto. OCAP address neo-liberal processes at the local
level, where its members fight what they see as a war against the poor
marked by attacks on workers' rights, cuts to social assistance, and the
criminalization of the results of these policies through banning
panhandling. There is significant overlap in analysis, tactics, and
participation between the two movements. For these reasons, I include
OCAp within my analysis of the global justice movement.
The segments of the global justice movement that are particularly
relevant to a consideration of bail have embraced the tactic of civil
disobedience. This tactic has been one of the most visible characteristics of
the anti-globalization demonstrations-spectators around the world have
seen images of protesters blockading the entrances to the sites of
international meetings, breaking windows of major banks and fast food
enterprises, and battling with police in extended street fights. OCAP carries
out frequent direct actions in government offices, taking delegations of
supporters to demand the release of a social assistance payment or to stop
the deportation of a refugee family.
These actions fall within the category described earlier as
constructive civil disobedience, flowing from the analyses activists have
made of neo-liberal globalization. Believing that there is no legitimate
democratic process in which dissenters can participate, activists have
created their own sources of political power through mass mobilization.
These mass demonstrations aim to interfere with the ability of powerful
states to carry forward the neo-liberal agenda. Lawbreaking is not itself the
goal of the demonstrations, and it is done only insofar as it is necessary in
order to have the desired effect. However in using the label civil
disobedience to describe some of the tactics used by the global justice
movement, it must be acknowledged that discretionary decisions by police
about arrest and charging practices have severely narrowed the scope for
lawful protest.
Virtually all political demonstrations involve some element of
illegality, even if this means only that demonstrators have taken over part
of a street or are obstructing a sidewalk.' A large range of offences could
be applied to a protest including trespass, unlawful assembly, causing a
disturbance, mischief, and breach of the peace. In practice this means that
25 Jonathan B. Eaton, "Is Picketing a Crime?" (1992) 47 Relations Industrielles 100; Mary Heath,
"Policing and Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Law" (1999) 17(1) Law in Context 15.
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the police have a powerful discretion to decide when a demonstration has
crossed the boundary between lawful protest and civil disobedience.
Thus where the state wishes to curb the power of a particularly
effective social movement, the criminal law is a powerful tool. Canadian
history is replete with examples of political movements that have been
subject to criminalization and repression by the state. Thomas Berger has
documented the use of such tactics against the Communist Party of
Canada, First Nations people, as well as the arrest and detention of
hundreds of people associated with a broad range of political dissent during
the October Crisis.26 The criminalization of dissent expands the boundaries
of civil disobedience, raising the risk that the state can treat political
expression as criminal in order to avoid civil rights obligations. As shall be
seen, the bail system has played a significant role in the narrowing of space
in which the global justice movement can carry out lawful political activity.
III. THE LAW OF BAIL IN CANADA
A. The Function and Law of Bail in Canada
Canadian bail provisions codified in the Criminal Code create a
basic entitlement to bail.27 Unless there is specific provision to the contrary,
there is a presumption that an accused person will be released without
conditions, and the onus rests with the prosecutor to show cause why an
accused person should be detained or conditions should be imposed. This
basic entitlement is also reflected in section 11(e) of the Charter, which
states that any person charged with an offence has the "right not to be
denied reasonable bail without just cause.
29
The bail system is designed to achieve a number of goals, and all
decisions made at a bail hearing must serve at least one of these goals.
Courts, which administer the bail system, have interpreted the purposes of
the bail system to include the need to ensure the accused's appearance in
court, to protect the public, and to prevent interferences with the
26 Thomas R. Berger, Fragile Freedoms: Human Rights and Dissent in Canada (Toronto: Irwin
Publishing Inc., 1982).
27 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 515; R v. Morales (1992), [1993177 C.C.C. (3d) 91 at 106
(S.C.C.) [Morales].
28 Section 515(6) of the Criminal Code sets out the situations in which the onus lies on the accused
to demonstrate why they should be released pending trial.
2 9 Supra note 3 at s. II(e).
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administration of justice.3° More recently, another purpose was codified,
providing that conditions may be imposed or bail may be denied where
restrictions are required to maintain confidence in the administration of
justice.3
A key principle underlying the bail system is the presumption of
innocence, which is a right guaranteed by the Charter to all accused persons
until they have been found guilty at the conclusion of a fair trial.32 Thus
pretrial detention should be based on factors that are completely
independent from the guilt or innocence of the accused since it is a
proceeding where "guilt or innocence is not determined and where
punishment is not imposed.
33
Where a person is released from detention with conditions, these
should be the least onerous conditions required in the circumstances.34
Section 515(2) of the Criminal Code provides for a ladder approach with a
series of increasingly onerous conditions. The prosecutor is required to
demonstrate why an order under paragraph (a) should not be made before
any consideration is given to paragraph (b) and so on until the end of the
list. All bail conditions imposed must be reasonable and must otherwise
comply with the Charter.35
The circumstances under which an accused person can be denied
bail are set out in section 515(10) of the Criminal Code:
For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on
one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be
dealt with according to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any
victim of or witness to the offence, having regard to all the circumstances including any
substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal
offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and
(c) on any other just cause being shown and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
where the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice,
having regard to all the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the prosecution's
30 Gary T. Trotter, Law of Bail in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 124-25.
31 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 515(10)(c).
32 Charter, supra note 3 at s. ll(d); Morales, supra note 27.
33 Morales, supra note 27 at 105.
34 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 515.
35 . Manseau, [1997] A.Q. No. 4553 (Qc. Sup. Ct. (Crim. Div.)), (QL) [Manseau].
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case, the gravity of the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission
and the potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.3
These three grounds for detention are referred to as the primary,
secondary, and tertiary grounds, and essentially state that a person can only
be detained where such a detention forwards one of the goals of the bail
system.
Detention of accused persons prior to trial has significant
repercussions on their ability to defend themselves and to have a fair trial.
Pretrial detention can lead to loss of income or even loss of employment.
It can affect an accused person's social relationships with family and
friends. Most troubling is the evidence demonstrating that a defendant held
for pretrial detention is more likely to be convicted and is more likely to be
given a custodial sentence upon conviction.a7
Given the impact on an accused's fair trial rights, pretrial detention
should only occur in very narrow circumstances. This caution is supported
by the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the protection offered
by section 11(e) of the Charter.a" First, the denial of bail must occur only in
a narrow set of circumstances. Secondly, the denial of bail must be
necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system and must
not be undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail system. "
B. Limiting Civil Rights: The Law of Bail Applied to Demonstrators
Bail conditions imposed on accused persons are often geared
towards preventing further criminal activity from occurring. When
36 Criminal Code, supra note 27. In R v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada struck
down as unconstitutional the following words from section 515(10)(c): "on any other just cause being
shown and without limiting the generality of the foregoing." The decisions discussed in Part IV, below,
were rendered prior to the R v. Hall decision.
37 This is so even where factors such as the gravity of the offence have been controlled for:
National Council of Welfare, Justice and the Poor (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 2000) at 30-32; Trotter, supra note 30 at 11. Remanded prisoners have less access to
counsel. They have more difficulty accessing witnesses and gathering evidence. Remanded prisoners
are also unable to take the steps to improve their social status that can have such an impact on their
ultimate sentence. For example, they cannot get employment, return to school, or engage in volunteer
activities.
38 Morales, supra note 27; P, v. Pearson (1992), [1993] 77 C.C.C. (3d) 124 (S.C.C.) [Pearson].
39 Despite the clear prejudice arising to remanded prisoners and the direction from the Supreme
Court of Canada, the statistics demonstrate that pretrial detention is a frequent occurrence. In 1999-
2000, 21 per cent of persons in custody were in remand on any given day, in all federal and
provincial/territorial jurisdictions, representing approximately 31,600 people. Since 1995-1996, the
average count of individuals in remand has increased by 27 per cent. See Statistics Canada, "Adult
Correctional Services in Canada, 1999-00" (2001) 21 Juristat 5 at 3-4.
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protesters are arrested, most of their alleged criminal activity has occurred
at demonstrations. Bail conditions prohibiting participation in
demonstrations may seem the most straightforward method of preventing
future offences. However, the difficulty with attempting to prevent future
criminal activity in this manner is that demonstrations depend on a number
of constitutionally protected rights such as freedom of peaceful assembly,
freedom of expression, and freedom of association.4 ° Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that political expression and
dissent lie at the very heart of the values protected by the freedom of
expression guarantee in the Charter.4' Restrictions on political speech are
justified only where they are absolutely necessary for the achievement of a
very compelling objective. As such, conditions intended to prevent further
criminal activity must be carefully drafted to protect civil and political
rights.
Courts have held that while complete bans on demonstrations are
not permitted, some types of restrictions on civil and political rights are
justified.42 In revoking a condition prohibiting a peace activist from
participating in demonstrations directed against a manufacturer of cruise
missiles, the Ontario County Court in R. v. Collins stated that in order to
override Charter guarantees of freedom of lawful assembly and expression,
the prosecution must show
that the restriction furthers an important or substantial state interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression, and the limitation sought on this basic freedom is no greater than
is necessary or essential for the protection of the public.'
District Court Justice Hogg suggested that in balancing these
interests the following factors should be considered: the nature of the
offence, the accused's criminal record, or other information to show
violence or anti-social behaviour of a dangerous nature; all surrounding
circumstances; whether the restrictions further a compelling state interest;
and whether the restrictions are precisely drawn without any unnecessary
erosion of rights. Restrictions on freedom of expression should not be
imposed on the basis of a speculative concern of danger. However, the case
did not explain which kinds of conditions would constitute permissible
restrictions.
40 Charter, supra note 3 at ss. 2(b), 2(c), 2(d).
41Libman v. Qudbec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569.
42 v. Collins (1982),[19831 31 C.R. (3d) 283 (Ont. Co. Ct.) [Collins]; Re Lawrence Francis (1979),
4 W.C.B. 31 [Francis]; Manseau, supra note 35.
Supra note 42 at 285.
Limits of Dissent
Manseau is the leading case addressing that question.44 The case
involved a request for a bail review by three men who were arrested at a
high-profile anti-poverty demonstration in Montreal in 1997.45 During the
demonstration, organized by the Comitj des Sans-Emploi, a group of people
went into a hotel and brought food from the buffet outside to the rest of the
demonstrators. Three of those arrested were given a condition prohibiting
participation in any demonstration until the end of the proceedings.
On review, the condition was varied. Justice Greenberg recognized
the significant and important role that political protest plays in a liberal
democracy:
In a [free and democratic society], everyone, as long as they act in a peaceful way and respect
the rights of others, has the right to free expression, to speak out against social conditions
and to effectively militate to change things, since no society is perfect.'
The two accused who were identified as members of the Comit6,
one of whom was described as a leader, were given conditions prohibiting
them from participating in demonstrations on private property and in non-
peaceable demonstrations in public places. Theywere also required to leave
any peaceable demonstration in the event that it became non-peaceable
and unlawful. The third man, who was not a member of the Comiti, was
given a condition that he "keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 47 It
is questionable whether these conditions meet the requirements set out in
Collins.
Although the requirement to keep the peace and be of good
behaviour is frequently imposed as a bail condition, it is not a statutory
condition-as it is for probation. Gary Trotter, the author of an
authoritative volume on the law of bail in Canada, has argued that the
condition is not appropriate in the bail context, where the presumption of
innocence remains in effect.4' The condition to be of good behaviour
requires compliance with legal obligations in federal, provincial, and
municipal statutes and regulatory provisions, as well as obligations in court
orders.49 The requirement to keep the peace prohibits a violent disruption
Supra note 35.
Ibid
Ibid. at para. 40 [translated by author].
4 7 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 732.1(2)(a)
48 Supra note 30 at 267.
4 9 R v. R (D.) (1999), [2000] 138 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (N.C.A.).
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or disturbance of public tranquility, peace, and order.50 It may include
behaviour that is not otherwise unlawful. It is arguable that this condition
alone-to keep the peace and be of good behaviour-could include all
public demonstrations, most of which breach the peace in one way or
another. Such a condition places an accused at risk of breaching bail
conditions for contraventions of provincial or municipal legislation or even
for legal behaviour that does not necessarily place the public at risk.
This same critique could be applied to the condition prohibiting
participation in non-peaceable demonstrations. The ambiguity surrounding
the phrase non-peaceable, and its potential application to any
demonstration, gives the police enormous discretion to arbitrarily decide
when the condition has been breached.
In effect, the Manseau conditions constitute a complete ban on
demonstrations, and thus could not be said to meet the requirement that
the limitation on Charter rights be no greater than necessary. Nor could the
activities carried out by the Comit6-taking food to feed homeless
people-reasonably be argued to pose a danger to the public. Nonetheless,
as shall be seen, the conditions imposed in Manseau have provided a model
for other bail cases involving protestors.
Despite potentially serious restrictions on key Charter rights, bail
decisions are fairly insulated from review. The bail review process provided
for by section 520 of the Criminal Code allows an accused person to have
bail conditions reviewed by the Superior Court. However, no appeal to an
appellate court is permitted. The only option available to an accused is to
bring a bail review to the Superior Court every thiry days. Bail decisions
that have reached appellate courts have generally done so by bringing a writ
of habeas corpus51-a remedy that is not available for those who have been
released on conditions. Further, people charged with breaching bail
conditions they believe to breach the Charter, are prohibited from
challenging the constitutionality of the condition at trial. The doctrine of
collateral attack requires that challenges to bail conditions be done through
the bail review process.52
The result has been that there are few reported decisions that deal
with the law of bail as it applies to civil disobedience and demonstrators.
Trends that are obvious to activists are invisible in the reported case law.
For this reason the material in the following case studies draws almost
50R v. S.(S.) (1999), [2000] 138 C.C.C. (3d) 430 (N.C.A.).
See e.g., Pearson, supra note 38.
52 R v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333; R v. Lee (J.), [1999] 120 O.A.C. 286.
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entirely from unreported decisions that are, nonetheless, well-known to
activists.
IV. CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICAL DISSENT THROUGH
THE IMPOSITION OF BAIL CONDITIONS
A. APEC Alert! and the Use of Undertakings
One of the first mass anti-globalization demonstrations in Canada
took place in Vancouver in late November 1997, in response to the APEC
Conference held at the University of British Columbia (UBC) campus.
Social justice groups were outraged that world leaders they considered to
be brutal dictators and violators of basic human rights would attend the
meetings. APEC-Alert!, a group organized on the basis of opposition to
APEC and a commitment to non-violent civil disobedience, was one of the
organizations that mobilized to demonstrate at the conference. The
conference was greeted by one of the largest peaceful demonstrations in
recent decades, which also included a significant civil disobedience
component such as the blockading of roads leading to the conference site.
The demonstrations were faced with one of the largest police mobilizations
in Canadian history.
Media images of these events showing peaceful protesters being
pepper sprayed, evidence of political interference in the RCMP plans, and
some well-founded anger on the part of demonstrators lead to the calling
of an inquiry into the RCMP's conduct. The resulting report, written by
Commissioner Ted Hughes, attempts to provide a concrete statement on
the appropriate balance between the policing of public order and the rights
of protesters.53 The Hughes Report documents a number of instances
where police substantially interfered with the Charter rights of protesters
who were engaged in entirely lawful conduct-for example, by removing a
Tibetan flag,5' by ordering the removal of signs expressing support for free
speech and democracy,55 and by arresting a protester on the basis that he
53 Regarding the Vancouver demonstrations see: Commission for Public Complaints Against the
RCMP, Commission Interim Report: Following a Public Hearing Into the Complaints regarding the events
that took place in connection with demonstrations during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference in Vancouver, B.C. in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and at the UBC and Richmond
detachments of the RCMP (Vancouver: Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, 2001)
[Hughes Report].
54 Ibid. at 242-62.
55 Ibid. at 263-73.
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was using a walkie-talkie.56 Hughes also decried several instances of
political interference by the federal government in the RCMP security
plans.57
Often overlooked among all of the RCMP actions that have come
under fire in the time since the conference, is the extremely serious threat
to political expression and participation arising out of some of the arrests
of civil disobedients prior to the conference itself. One such case was the
high-profile arrest of Jaggi Singh, the person the police believed to be the
leader of APEC-Alert!.
1. Targeting leaders of civil disobedience organizations
Jaggi Singh's arrest, three days before the conference began, was
dramatic. While walking on the UBC campus he was suddenly surrounded
by four officers and taken to the ground with a police officer covering his
mouth so that he could not scream. A police car then rushed up alongside
the group, and he was thrown into the car, face down, with his hands
handcuffed behind his back.58 The car rushed off, with the whole operation
completed in a matter of minutes. Singh was charged with assaulting a UBC
security officer three weeks earlier, at another demonstration. The security
officer claimed that his ear was injured when Singh spoke too loudly into
a megaphone.59
When Singh was eventually brought before a Justice of thePeace,
a condition prohibiting him from being on the UBC campus or the
University Endowment Lands was imposed. This effectively prohibited him
from attending the site of the APEC conference or participating in any of the
planned demonstrations.60
It is clear from documents disclosed at the Inquiry that the police
had planned to arrest Singh just prior to the demonstrations and to impose
bail conditions that would prevent him from participating. But it is also
clear that in so doing, the RCMP had a larger purpose. In an e-mail written
by Staff Sergeant Plante to four detachments in the Lower Mainland,
Plante stated the following:
5 6 Ibid at 291-300.
5 7 1bid. at 55-74.
58 Ibid at 195-97.
59 Ibid. at 182.
60 Ibid at 199.
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It is hoped that we can obtain support from Crown which may result in a charge of assault
against the obvious leader of the group, JAGGY SINGH. It is our intention if we can obtain
a "no-go UBC" with respect to SINGH, we may basically "break the back" of this group
[APE-Alert!].6
APEC-Alert! was one of the key groups that prepared for the
conference. It also carried out a series of demonstrations and educational
events in the months leading up to the APEC conference.
At the inquiry, Commissioner Hughes found that Plante's motive
in Singh's arrest was "to eliminate Mr. Singh from campus on November 25
and 'break the back' of APEC Alert, thereby making the job of providing
security easier than it likely would have been had Mr. Singh been present
to give leadership to the protest movement."62 In so doing, the RCMP
attempted to prevent Singh from participating in the demonstrations and
expressing his opposition to APEC's policies.
Such a bail condition clearly violates the principles set out in
Collins, which require that bail conditions restricting expression be imposed
for reasons unrelated to the suppression of expression. 63 The bail conditions
were imposed with the sole purpose of suppressing expression. Nor could
Hughes identify any pressing state interest to justify such restrictions on
Singh's Charter rights, given his finding that Singh did not pose a threat to
any of the delegates to the conference, to the security guard in question, or
to the public.
As troubling as this violation of Singh's Charter rights may be, it is
equally troubling that these conditions were imposed as a direct attack on
APEC-Alert!. Singh was singled out because he was seen as APEC-Alert!'s
leader. It forms part of a trend, appearing throughout these case studies, of
police targeting perceived leaders. This practice serves as a warning to
other demonstrators to curb their behaviour, but may also have the effect
of undermining activist organizations by removing key organizers who
cannot easily be replaced. It involves the justice system, and the bail system
in particular, in a direct attack on political organizing by groups expressing
dissent to neo-liberalism.
61Ibid at 186. In British Columbia every potential criminal charge is subject to a "pre-charge
screening" which allows the Crown to vet charges before they are laid. Therefore consent from the
Crown would have been required before the assault charge could have been laid.
62 1bid. at 211.
63 Supra note 42 at 285.
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2. Prohibiting participation in demonstrations
Singh was not the only demonstrator prevented from participating
in the demonstrations by bail conditions, though he was the only specifically
targeted individual. In advance of the demonstrations, the RCMP prepared
a set of bail conditions to be imposed on all other demonstrators arrested.
These conditions were much more explicit in prohibiting participation in
the anti-APEC demonstrations than those imposed on Singh.
Corporal Harrison of the RCMP was the head of prisoner handling
for the conference. He prepared an operational plan, part of which read:
"The unit is responsible for ensuring that any prisoner released prior to
Court be released before a Justice of the Peace with appropriate conditions
to limit their access to any of the Conference venues or dignitaries."
4
Despite the fact that bail decisions are to be individually tailored to meet
the goals of bail in each case, a blanket list of conditions was prepared to
apply to all arrestees, regardless of their alleged offence or circumstances:
1. I will not attend within 100 metres of any venue or site where officials of foreign
governments participating in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation may be in attendance
between the dates November 18th, 1997, and November 26th, 1997, [named locations
deleted];
2. I will, upon being notified by any peace officer that I am within 100 metres of an
internationally protected person or official delegate to the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation immediately depart from that location following the direction of such peace
officer;
3. I will not participate or be found in attendance at any public demonstration or rally that
has gathered together for the sole purpose of demonstrating against the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation or any nation participating in the so named conference.6
As events unfolded, the RCMP did make use of these prepared conditions.
On November 17, 1997, a tent city dubbed Democracy Village was
set up outside the Student Union building. A satellite camp called
Freedom's Outpost was set up outside the Museum of Anthropology on
November 20, 1997, with the intention of symbolically reclaiming the
campus and providing a focal point for information and discussion.6
64 Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 158.
65 Ibid. at 158-59.
66 For a description of the events, see Karen Pearlston, "APEC Days at UBC: Student Protests and
National Security in an Era of Trade Liberalization" in Gary Kinsman, Deiter K. Buse and Mercedes
Steedman, eds., Whose National Security?: Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of Enemies
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000) 267 at 271. See also Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 184.
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Although the campers did not present any security threat to the APEC
conference67 and were exercising important citizenship rights to freedom of
expression,'8 the RCMP ordered all the protesters to leave the grounds of
the Museum of Anthropology on the evening of November 22.69 When six
individuals refused to leave, they were arrested. They were all required to
agree to the planned conditions by signing an undertaking in front of the
officer-in-charge to obtain their release.7°
To address the last condition first, a requirement that those
arrested not participate in any anti-APEC demonstrations is clearly an
explicit ban on protest, and is not constitutionally permitted. t As the RCMP
later agreed, such wording was "unfortunate. 72 Commissioner Hughes also
noted that the ban on demonstrations went far beyond a police officer's
power to impose conditions of release as provided for in the Criminal
Code.
73
Commissioner Hughes found that the first two undertakings were
unlawful. The condition prohibiting the arrestees from being within one
hundred metres of any conference delegate or Internationally Protected
Person was over broad because it essentially created a "moving bubble zone
around a large number of unnamed persons. 74 The police bail provisions
of the Criminal Code do not empower the police to make orders of this
nature.75 Prohibitions preventing the accused from being within one
hundred metres of conference locations did not constitute reasonable bail,
because the accused persons were arrested on very minor offences, and
there was no hint of suspected violence or threat to the Internationally
Protected Persons at the Summit nor to any other APEC officials.6
These findings came too late for those arrested, because the police
goal of preventing known civil disobedients from attending anti-APEC
demonstrations was achieved, and this goal could not be effectively
67 Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 55.
68 Ibid. at 98.
69 Hughes found that the removal of these demonstrators was directly attributable to improper
interference by the federal government: ibid. at 101.
70 As provided for in Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 498.
71Collins, supra note 42; Francis, supra note 42; Manseau, supra note 35.
72 Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 162.
Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 503(2.1).
Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 64.
Criminal Code, supra note 27 at ss. 497-99.
76 Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 168.
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challenged at a time when it would have made a difference. For example,
when Singh attended the demonstrations on November 24 despite
conditions prohibiting him from doing so, he was arrested for a second
time. Regardless of his finding that Singh's bail conditions were
inappropriate and unconstitutional, Hughes soundly denounced Singh for
defying the court order: "With his deliberate disrespect for and
disobedience of a court order and the undertaking which he had signed, this
self-styled anarchist could not have expected otherwise from police officers
sworn to uphold and respect the law."0
7
Bail is an area of law over which police have a great deal of
influence, either through the direct imposition of conditions prior to release
from a station, or by recommendations made to Crown counsel. 8 It is also
an area of law that can be effectively shielded from review because, as
explained in Part III, above, there are no reviews by appeal courts for those
who have bail conditions imposed by a Justice of the Peace.
The use of conditions to prohibit political participation by civil
disobedience groups was condemned by Commissioner Hughes in his
report on the RCMP actions at the anti-APEC demonstrations. This
condemnation is significant, given the paucity of reported decisions on bail
with respect to activists. Unfortunately, the public outcry regarding RCMP
actions and the findings of the inquiry had little impact on policing at mass
protests. In fact, the APEC inquiry has been surpassed by history, as policing
at mass global justice demonstrations since 1997 make the APEC scandal
appear tame in comparison. As the treatment of OCAP will show, the use of
bail conditions to control dissent has continued unabated.
B. "Breaking the Back" of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty
OCAP is an organization based in Toronto that has chosen direct
action as its method of challenging poverty. Most of OCAP's work involves
"direct action casework," through which the organization assists individuals
who approach them for help with housing, social assistance, or immigration
matters, among other things. OCAP begins by attempting to negotiate a
just resolution with the relevant government agency. If this does not work
77 Ibid at 233-34. Hughes appears to be somewhat hasty in judging the police actions in the second
arrest to have been appropriate. Since the second arrest was not the subject of a complaint, he did not
investigate all of the circumstances surrounding it. Significantly he did not address the real motivation
for the arrest, given that no charges-of breaching a bail condition or otherwise-were ever laid
(Interview of Jaggi Singh 17 March 2002 [Singh]).
78 Ontario, Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 147, 151.
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an "action" may be called where, for example, a delegation of people may
hold a demonstration at the relevant office until a welfare cheque is
released or a deportation order has been stayed. OCAP has successfully
assisted hundreds of people in this way.
OCAP is better known for the large demonstrations it has
organized, largely due to the major confrontations with police that have
sometimes resulted. As OCAP has grown and its influence has spread
beyond its relatively small membership, it has been faced with increasingly
severe police repression. Massive police operations are now the norm at
OCAP demonstrations, and arrests are increasingly common.79
As has been seen, arrests related to demonstrations and political
organizing can pose a challenge to the bail system, since concerns about
Charter rights must be balanced with concerns about re-offence. Examining
bail decisions concerning those arrested at OCAP demonstrations highlights
the importance of achieving a proper balance. Through the bail system,
participation in OCAP activities has been restricted and criminalized in two
ways: through conditions that prohibit participation in demonstrations or
association with OCAP and through the denial of bail for leaders of the
organization. When all of these tactics are seen together, it appears that the
criminal law is being used to try to break the organization.
1. Conditions that prohibit demonstrations and association
The case law relating to bail conditions and demonstrations makes
it extremely clear that complete bans on protest are not permitted. This
important principle was reaffirmed by Commissioner Hughes in his report
on the APEC inquiry. Despite this seeming clarity, it is not uncommon for
the Crown, when prosecuting persons arrested at OCAP protests, to seek
conditions barring participation in all demonstrations. This trend began
with a high profile demonstration at Queen's Park on June 15, 2000.
The demonstration was called to protest three elements of the
Ontario government's social policies-the 22 per cent reduction of welfare
benefits, the passage of the Safe Streets Act,80 and the attack on tenant rights
79
Although some would justify this response by the state by referring to OCAP as a violent
organization bent on anarchy, I would argue that a careful assessment of OCAP demonstrations would
show that any violence that has occurred has been in direct response to police attacks. Furthermore,
many OCAP actions involving loud, angry, or insistent tactics have been wrongly characterized as
violent-for example the peaceful occupation of a public park in 1999 to highlight the problem of
homelessness. Militant organizing should not automatically be equated with violence.
80 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 8.
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in the Tenant Protection Act.81 The organizers demanded that a delegation
be given the opportunity to speak to the Legislature. When this request was
denied, demonstrators moved forward, intent on entering Queen's Park to
speak to the Legislature. What ensued was a spectacular confrontation
between the police and demonstrators. The police called it a riot. The
demonstrators claimed that they were attacked by the police.
Three leading members of OCAP were arrested several weeks after
the demonstration and, as a condition of release, all three were ordered to
abstain from communicating with any member of OCAP, and were
prohibited from participating in any demonstration, march, or protest. On
review before Justice Grossi, these conditions were varied based on the
principles in Manseau.2 The new conditions read:
From now until the end of the current proceedings, each is prohibited from participating in
demonstrations taking place in a public place or on public land unless said demonstration is
peaceable and lawful. From now until the end of the current proceedings, if while
participating in or being present at a demonstration which was peaceable and lawful, said
demonstration becomes non-peaceable and/or unlawful, each must leave the premises
immediately. And I would further add the condition: From now until the end of the current
proceedings, each is prohibited from participating in organizing, aiding or abetting any
unlawful acts or demonstrations.
83
These new conditions were then imposed on all those arrested at the same
demonstration.
On the surface, the latter condition merely imposes a requirement
that all individuals are required to meet-no one is permitted to organize,
aid, or abet unlawful acts. The requirement that the accused leave any
demonstration that has become unlawful seems to address the concern that
the accused will re-offend at future demonstrations. As in Manseau, these
conditions effect a blanket ban on protest, interfering with political
expression.
First, as discussed in Part II, above, the line between lawful and
unlawful protest is difficult to pinpoint. There are a large range of offences
that could be applied to even the most peaceful demonstration. In the
abstract, it is possible for a person to breach bail conditions simply by
attending a demonstration for which a permit has not been obtained.
Second, the prohibition on being present at a non-peaceable demonstration
is potentially even broader than the restriction to lawful demonstrations,
since it does not even require that any illegal act occur. Third, these bail
811997, S.O. 1997, c. 24.
8 2 R v. Clarke, [2000] O.J. No. 5738 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.) (QL) [Clarke 1].
831MidL at para. 15.
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conditions place accused people at risk of breaching their bail conditions
based on the illegal or non-peaceable activity of otherpeople. Breach occurs
by the accused person's mere presence during the commission of a non-
peaceable or unlawful act at a demonstration. It would be difficult to
imagine any demonstration that a person under such conditions could
attend without resulting in a breach.
Although Justice Grossi was attempting to satisfy his concern that
the three accused would engage in further acts of civil disobedience, these
conditions limit far more than civil disobedience. They limit the exercise of
basic civil rights, including freedom of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly, as well as interfering with political organizing for social change.
These limitations are particularly troubling when they arise in a context
where the presumption of innocence remains a guiding principle.
One of the other conditions that was challenged in Clarke I was an
order that all three accused abstain from communicating or associating with
any member of OCAP. At the time, all three were members of the OCAP
executive. One was employed on a full-time basis by the organization.
Conditions of non-association with co-accused or witnesses are fairly
common in the context of bail. These types of conditions are imposed in
order to protect victims from harassment by an accused and to prevent co-
accused from colluding with each other in terms of their evidence. 4 There
must be a legitimate basis for restricting the accused person's associations
and activities prior to trial, as the constitutionally protected freedom to
associate is implicated. The non-association condition in this case went far
beyond the typical condition, prohibiting the three accused from associating
with an entire political organization.
Justice Grossi struck down this condition, acknowledging that OCAP
carries out very important work with and for marginalized people in the
City of Toronto, which the non-association condition would have
prohibited. Justice Grossi stated that the condition was "over broad in that
it restricts communication for peaceful and lawful employment purposes
and association with the non-violent elements of the organization."6 This
holding is in keeping with Commissioner Hughes's finding at the APEC
inquiry that mere membership in a group, "some of whose members may
have broken the law or may intend to break the law," does not justify
overriding a person's Charter rights.8
84 Trotter, supra note 30 at 259.
85 Ibid at 260.
86 Clarke 1, supra note 82 at para. 16.
8 7 Hughes Report, supra note 52 at 205.
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Despite this precedent, it is now routine in cases involving OCAP
activists for the Crown to demand a condition that they be prohibited from
"communication or association, directly or indirectly, with any member of
the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty and not to be found at any public or
private meetings of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty." This
condition is requested even in cases where the basis of the charge before
the court has no connection to OCAP. 89
An Ontario Common Front demonstration on October 16, 2001,
provides an excellent example of the imposition of the non-association
condition in circumstances that only indirectly involved OCAP. The Ontario
Common Front was a loose coalition of approximately seventy social justice
and labour organizations from across the province. OCAP was one of these
seventy member organizations. The stated goal of the demonstration was
to shut down Bay Street, in order to highlight the links between Ontario
government policies and big business. Demonstrators defied police
attempts to keep them out of the financial district, but remained peaceful.
Nonetheless, there were approximately forty people arrested, twenty-three
of which were charged criminally. All twenty-three were required to agree
to a non-association with OCAP condition in order to secure their release
from custody, regardless of the fact that the demonstration was organized
by the Ontario Common Front. No other member organizations of the
Ontario Common Front were named.
The impact of imposing such a condition on all activists connected
to OCAP, however tangentially, is fairly predictable. Where the condition is
imposed in sufficient number, it affects the ability of the organization to
function by preventing new members from joining, and by preventing
current members from participating in the work of the group. The
persistence on the part of the Crown in requesting restrictions on
association with OCAP must be assessed in light of this foreseeable
consequence. If the motive is to break the back of the Ontario Coalition
Against Poverty, the condition was not imposed to meet a legitimate
purpose of the bail system and violates the freedom to associate.
8 8 R v. Porter (27 June 2001), Toronto 5259/01 (Ont. Ct. Just.) at 7 (Show Cause Hearing).
89 The same Crown Counsel has appeared at many OCAP related bail hearings. He is well aware
of the Clarke decision regarding the constitutionality of the non-association condition with OCAP, having
acted for the Crown in that matter. In Antonioni, a homeless and developmentally disabled man who
had received a great deal of support from OCAP, was arrested for assault when he spit on a security
guard who was forcing him to get off the park bench where he was sleeping. He was among those
awaiting trial on charges arising from the Queen's Park demonstration. At his show cause hearing on
the security guard assault, he was told by the Crown Attorney that if he did not agree to the "non-
association with OCAP" he would not be granted bail: R v. Antonioni (15 June 2001), Toronto (Ont. Ct.
Just.) (Show Cause Hearing, Jewitt J.P.).
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2. Detention and denial of bail of perceived leaders
On at least three occasions, bail has been denied altogether to
persons arrested at an OCAP demonstration: R. v. San Martin,90 R. v. Lee-
Popham,91 and R. v. Clarke and Zareian.92 All three cases involved accused
persons who were described by Crown Counsel as leaders or ringleaders.
All three were released after a bail review, demonstrating that in some
situations the bail review process can be effective in overturning
unjustifiable detention orders. In Lee-Popham and Clarke 2, each accused
was seeking to be released on bail after having been charged with breach
of a condition that they immediately leave any demonstration that became
non-peaceable or unlawful, and that they keep the peace and be of good
behaviour. These two cases therefore provide an opportunity to examine
the way in which bail conditions restricting political activity can build up
over time, thus justifying further restrictions when they are broken.
Sean Lee-Popham was arrested at an OCAP action on June 12, 2001.
The demonstration was called to draw attention to the fact that there have
been up to one thousand evictions of tenants every month in Toronto since
the introduction of the Tenant Protection Act by the Ontario government.
OCAP members allegedly went to the offices of Ontario's Finance Minister
and carried out a symbolic eviction-allegedly removing the furniture and
throwing it in the street. At the time Lee-Popham was out on bail, under
the same conditions imposed by Justice Grossi in Clarke 1, which meant
that he bore the onus of showing why he should be released. 93
Lee-Popham was described by police as being part of a "core
nucleus of ... radical extremists." 94 The Crown revoked his former bail
under section 524 of the Criminal Code and requested that he be detained
under the secondary and tertiary ground. The Justice of the Peace willingly
obliged, after she reserved her judgment for one week, during which time
Lee-Popham remained in detention. She denied bail on the secondary
ground for the following reasons:
90 . v. San Martin (16 June 2000), Toronto (Ont. Ct. Just.) (Show Cause Hearing) [San Martin].
91 R v. Lee-Popham (27 June 2001), Toronto 104998-11 (Ont. Ct. Just.) (Judgment at Show Cause
Hearing) [Lee-Popham].
92 R v. Clarke and Zareian (29 June 2001), Toronto 4998/01, 4609/01, 4929/01, 4938/01 (Ont. Ct.
Just.) (Judgment at Show Cause Hearing) [Clarke 21.
93 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 515(6)(c).
9 4 R v. Lee-Popham (21 June 2001), Toronto 104998-11 (Ont. Ct. Just.) (Transcript of Show Cause
Hearing) at 45.
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The offences before this court, if taken individually, are serious. Taken collectively, they are
frightening. The evidence describes a group of people, including Mr. Lee-Popham. They
entered a business premises in Whitby, terrorized four employees, ransacked the premises,
threw glue-filled files, desks, and computers onto the street. ... The Crown's case, in my
opinion, is solid. There is positive identification by several independent eye-witnesses, as well
as convincing statements by the terrified employees of the business establishment." ... All
offences before us, including both Toronto and Whitby incidents are offences that put the
general public in jeopardy. ... From evidence heard to date, he has indeed breached his
outstanding bail conditions. -
The Justice of the Peace then concluded that since Lee-Popham had been
"[thumbing] his nose at court orders,"'97 he would continue with his criminal
activity and would interfere with the administration of justice. He was
therefore denied bail on the secondary ground.
By basing her decision to deny bail on her finding that Lee-Popham
had breached his bail conditions, Justice of the Peace Kay clearly violated
the presumption of innocence. 8 Although she may have felt that the case
against Lee-Popham was strong, if the presumption of innocence is to have
any meaning, the decision to deny bail cannot be based on a finding that the
person is guilty. At a bail hearing the accused does not have many of the
procedural and evidentiary protections that are available at trial, and
generally is not able to put forward a defence. The strength of the Crown's
case can be assessed as one factor, indicating that the accused is likely to
flee, for example. But it remains only one factor to be considered among
others.99 The same error was made in Clarke 2, where a finding that Clarke
was guilty of breaching his bail conditions was the basis for denying bail on
the secondary ground.
The tertiary ground, found in section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal
Code, provides for detention where it is necessary to deny bail in order to
maintain confidence in the administration of justice. Section 515(10)(c)
delineates four factors to be considered in making this determination: the
apparent strength of the prosecution's case, the gravity of the nature of the
95 A reading of the transcript of the bail proceedings indicates that there was, in fact, only one
eyewitness identification. There were no statements from the "terrified employees" either identifying
him or describing the actions of anyone that could possibly have been the accused: Lee-Popham, supra
note 91.
96 Lee-Popham, supra note 91 at 4-7 [emphasis added].
97 Ibid. at 5.
98 It should be noted that this was only one of many errors in the judgment. Other notable errors
included findings of fact that could not be supported by the record and a decision to deny bail on the
tertiary ground on the basis only that "the notional member of the public would be alarmed" if Lee-
Popham was released on bail: ibid. at 8.
99 Trotter, supra note 30 at 128-29.
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offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the potential
for a lengthy term of imprisonment. As interpreted by the Supreme Court
of Canada, the provision allows a judge to deny bail only if that judge is
satisfied that, in view of the four specified factors and related
circumstances, a reasonable member of the community would be satisfied
that denial of bail is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration
of justice."° This provision appears to be geared toward allowing the courts
to consider the possible public reaction to the release of accused people,
particularly where they have committed an offence that has generated a lot
of publicity and public outcry. In effect, Parliament has provided the courts
with an utterly discretionary ground for detention. t1 As discretionary as
this ground appears, at the time that these cases were decided, the tertiary
ground was even more broadly construed; prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in R. v. Hall, courts were also permitted to deny bail "on any other
just cause being shown."1°2 The dangers of misuse, which are so likely to
occur when courts have total discretion to deny bail, are readily apparent
in San Martin.0 3
Magaly San Martin, an activist who has been vigorous in opposing
police brutality, was arrested shortly after the OCAP demonstration at
Queen's Park in June 2000. She is originally from Chile, though she has
lived in Canada for close to 30 years. The police described her as a
ringleader. At the end of the bail hearing, Justice of the Peace Lewin
ordered the detention of the fully employed Canadian citizen and Ph.D.
student with no prior record or arrests. She was denied bail on the tertiary
ground:
The secondary ground gives me some concern because it's obviously not a one-shot affair.
Being a ringleader she's been involved in these prior or before.
The greatest concern I have is the public at large, what they would think, the tertiary ground.
The public would be outraged, in my opinion, when the Legislature of this province is
stormed by protesters and when they don't get their way they then turn to some form of
violence, either rocks, bottles, cans, whatever they throw, to get their way. This is not a
democratic way of doing things. It may be very well from where this lady comes from that
they do things like that, but this province [interruption as spectators in the courtroom are
cleared after a disruption] ... this may be the way they do-do protests or carry on from
R v. HaIl supra note 36 at para. 41.
101For a critique of the tertiary ground, see: Louis P. Strezos, "Section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal
Code: Resurrecting the Unconstitutional Denial of Bail" (1998) 11 C.R. 43 at 48.
102 R v. Hall, supra note 36 at para. 18.
103 Supra note 90.
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where this lady comes from, but in this country, this is democratic, go-if you don't like what
we're doing, but you don't riot on the Legislative steps.
I'm satisfied that on the tertiary ground alone, and that's the only ground that I find that the
Crown has satisfied me, this lady will be detained.'
When asked by defence counsel to reconsider his comments, Justice of the
Peace Lewin repeated his comments about Chile three times' 05 San Martin
was forced to remain in jail for a further four days, until the decision was
easily overturned on review. She was released on a $1,000 surety with a
condition that she stay away from the Legislature and not possess
weapons.1" San Martin made a complaint to the Justice of the Peace
Review Council regarding Justice of the Peace Lewin's comments. In a
letter to San Martin dated July 9,2001, the Council stated that while Justice
of the Peace Lewin's comments with respect to Chile were inappropriate
and unacceptable, his decision was based on legal criteria alone.
As can be seen, the language employed in the prosecution of these
leaders is inflammatory, ranging from explicit xenophobia to moral hysteria.
As a further example, in seeking (and achieving) pretrial detention of OCAP
organizer John Clarke, the Crown Prosecutor repeatedly referred to him
as a terrorist."' Targeting leaders of social movements is a time-honoured
tactic employed by the state in order to intimidate and to attempt to curb
the effectiveness of the movement'08 The loss of leadership can be a great
loss to an organization, and can force it to focus on legal matters at the
expense of its everyday advocacy.
Attempting to render an organization ineffective by removing its
key organizers is far beyond the purposes of bail. Nevertheless, implicit in
the operation of the three tactics that have been discussed-prohibitions
on protest, pretrial detention of leaders, and conditions preventing
participation in OCAP-is a concerted attempt to criminalize OCAP, to
demonize OCAP in the public eye, to frighten potential recruits to the
104 Ibid. at 16-17.
105 Ibid. at 17-18.
106 "Accused in Riot Calls JP 'Racist' The Toronto Sun (20 June 2000) 5.
107 Clarke 2, supra note 92 at 143.
108 See Michael E. Deutsch, "The Improper Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An Instrument for
the Internment of Political Activists" (1984) 75 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1159; Richard
Eiden & Dolores W. Warner, "Defense of Political Activists: Some Pretrial Procedures in Criminal
Defense Arising from Demonstrations and Other Political Activity" (1986) 18 University of West Los
Angeles L. Rev. 77 at 79; I. Umoja, "Misuse of the Grand Jury Apparatus to Indict African (Black)
Political Activists in the U.S.A." (1986) 13 S.U.L. Rev. 63.
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organization and to break the organization itself. Whether these results are
intended or not, they are a predictable outcome.
The three tactics also operate together, placing OCAP members in
situations where they must choose which Charter right they wish to
maintain. For example, in order for one member to be released from
pretrial detention, he had to agree not to attend any demonstrations. 109
Others have been forced to agree to not attend demonstrations in order to
have a non-association with OCAP condition varied. The result is an
organization facing enormous legal fees, with many of its key members
either in the position that they cannot attend demonstrations or that they
cannot associate with OCAP itself-and all this is accomplished through the
normal functioning of the bail system.
C. Demonstrations at the Summit of the Americas, Quebec City 2001
The protests at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City at the
end of April 2001 were widely anticipated by those in the global justice
movement. The demonstrations were called to protest the creation of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FrAA), a free trade agreement that
protesters argue is fundamentally undemocratic. They argue that the
agreement will give corporations control over key social policies, leading to
the privatization of resources and services. Civil disobedience was to be one
aspect of the demonstrations, as some protestors hoped to have an impact
on the ability of the world leaders to pursue their free trade agenda.
The preparations for the protests triggered the largest police
operation in Canadian history (an honour previously reserved for the anti-
APEC demonstrations).1 Police predicted that there would be hundreds of
arrests, and the Orsainville prison was emptied to prepare for this
eventuality. Protesters were greeted by a security fence surrounding much
of the Old City, which effectively shielded the Summit participants from
any view of the protests. This fence became the target of much of the civil
disobedience over the course of the weekend, as protesters made repeated
attempts (occasionally successful ones) to breach the security perimeter."'
As predicted, there were hundreds of arrests over a three-day
period, mostly of those protesting near the security fence. Given the huge
number of arrests, it is not surprising that there were lengthy processing
delays. However, there is evidence of a deliberate effort to use bail
109 Clarke Z supra note 92.
110 Hughes Report, supra note 53 at 14.
III For an account see McNally, supra note 22.
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provisions in order to keep protesters off the streets for the duration of the
Summit.
Several weeks before the Quebec City demonstrations, a report
appeared in the (Montreal) Gazette about a defection from the special
eight-member team that had been put together to prosecute any protesters
arrested at the Summit."2 One member of the team resigned to protest an
order by provincial Justice Minister Paul Begin, directing them to delay all
bail hearings for a maximum of three days as a way of "keeping them
[protesters] off the street for the duration of the Summit. 11 3 This order is
in direct violation of the bail provisions of section 503 of the Criminal Code,
which provides that upon arrest a person must be brought before a Justice
within twenty-four hours where a Justice is available unless that person is
released by the police at an earlier time. Where a Justice is not available
within twenty-four hours, the person must be brought before a Justice as
soon as possible-however the delay before remand cannot exceed three
days.'14 The only exception to a bail hearing within twenty-four hours occurs
when there is no Justice available." 5 Thus a high-level government
representative was giving direct orders to prosecutors, which would have
the effect of unlawfully detaining protesters, for the express purpose of
preventing demonstrators from expressing their opposition to the FTAA.
Despite the defection of one member of the prosecution team, all
evidence indicates that the rest of the special team of prosecutors followed
these orders. The Ligue des droits et libertds, a group engaged in legal
observation throughout the Summit, found that very few of those arrested
were arraigned within the usual twenty-four-hour period and that many did
not have a bail hearing within seventy-two hours. t6 Since the
demonstrations occurred over the course of the weekend, the prosecutors
argued that the days spent in custody over the weekend were not to be
included when assessing whether those arrested were brought before the
court within three days-an interpretation that cannot be supported by the
legislation.
112 William Marsden, "Prosecutors Say They Are Being Used to Control Protestors" The
(Montreal) Gazette (5 April 2001) A6.
113 Ibid.
114 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 516.
115 Ibid. at s. 503(2).
116 Sam Boskey, "Report: Observing Civil Liberties at the Qu6bec Summit" (2001) 63 Socialist
Studies Bulletin 60 at 63.
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Furthermore, most arrestees were denied access to a lawyer until
their bail hearing began."' The Quebec Legal Collective had provided
lawyers to assist any protesters arrested at the Summit. When the lawyers
asked for a few minutes to consult with their clients, most of whom had not
had an earlier opportunity to speak with their lawyer, the judge presiding
insisted on adjourning the bail hearing to the next day. 8 Lack of access to
a lawyer was compounded by the fact that bail hearings took place by video-
conference, with the accused remaining in the prison. Since the lawyer
representing the accused was in the courtroom, it was very difficult for the
lawyer to give, and for the client to receive, meaningful advice.
At the end of the Summit, the Ligue was unable to come to any
conclusion other than that the police responsible for the Orsainville prison
were deliberately terrorizing the people who found themselves there.n9 The
special team of prosecutors contributed to this atmosphere of terror by
illegitimately forcing those arrested to spend more time in jail for the
improper purpose of preventing them from taking part in the
demonstrations against the FTAA.
Jaggi Singh, the presumed leader of APEC-Alert!, reappeared
among those detained in the Orsainville prison. He found himself arrested
in virtually the same fashion as he was in British Columbia. Six police
officers quickly surrounded him as he was peacefully walking at some
distance from the site where the apparent riot was taking place. Within
thirty seconds he was grabbed and thrown, face first, into a waiting
vehicle."2 He was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon,
participating in a riot, and breach of recognizance.
The evidence lead against him at his bail hearing, five days later,
consisted of the testimony of an arresting officer, who described Singh as
having a leading role in the demonstrations. The officer stated that Singh
gave direct orders to so-called agitators to advance to the perimeter and to
take down the fence."' After the fence was torn down, Singh was described
as having ordered the advancement of a large catapult to be used for
117 Ligue des droits et libert6s, Violations des droits et liberts au Sommet des Amiriques, Qudbec
Avil 2001 (Montrial: Ligue, 2001) [Ligue Report] at 27-28.
118 For further information on the Qu6bec Legal Collective see online:
<http://www.quebeclegal.org> (date accessed: 1 January 2003).
119 Ligue Report, supra note 117 at 54.
120 R c. Singh (25 Avril 2001), Qu6bec 200-01-062331-016, 200-01-062332-014 (C.Q.) at 23
(Transcript of Show Cause Hearing) [Singh 2a].
121 Ibid. at 11.
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launching Molotov cocktails.122 The officer stated that identity was not in
issue because all of the police officers in his section received pictures of
Singh before the demonstration.' 23
The problem with this testimony was that the officer had not
witnessed any of the events he described, nor did he know the source of the
information. He was not able to say how many people along the chain of
command had communicated the information about Singh's actions before
it got to him. a24 While hearsay is permitted in a bail hearing, the court
should be cautious in attributing too much weight to such information.
12
This is particularly so where, as here, the origins of the information are
unknown. Since the laws of evidence are relaxed at the bail stage, it is even
more important that courts not make findings of guilt in this forum.
Singh's case is an excellent example of how bail conditions, such as
those described with respect to OCAP, have the effect of restraining protest.
At the time of his arrest, Singh was out on bail with respect to two other
demonstrations. First, he was arrested at a demonstration in the Montreal
suburb of Westmount in May 2000, and charged with unlawful assembly,
causing a disturbance by yelling and mischief (spray painting). At this bail
hearing he was described as a ringleader, and released on bail conditions
virtually identical to those imposed on OCAP members, except that they
were limited to the City of Westmount. As stated orally by Justice Ham in
court, the conditions were to be of good conduct; to keep the peace; "to not
participate in any demonstration on private property in the City of
Westmount without having previously obtained the consent, the express
consent of the owner"; "to not participate in any demonstration in any
place or public lot in the City of Westmount unless such demonstration is
peaceful and legal"; and if participating or found on the premises "where
a demonstration which is peaceable in origin and legal and, during which
such demonstration becomes not peaceable or illegal, to immediately leave
the premises without any delay.""2 Unfortunately, the written version of the
conditions did not include the reference to the City of Westmount, a fact
that has caused significant problems for Singh ever since.
122 Ibid. at 17.
123 Ibid. at 20, 50.
124 Ibid. at 56.
125 Section 518(1)(e) of the Criminal Code permits the justice or judge to hear any evidence it
deems to be credible and trustworthy: supra note 27 at s. 518(1)(e).
126 c. Singh (2 May 2000), Montreal 1005-7095 (M.C.) [Singh 1] at 9-10 (Transcript of Decision
at Show Cause Hearing).
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Singh was arrested again at a demonstration organized against a
meeting of the G-20 in October 2000. The police accused him of inciting
and leading a crowd of one hundred people with masks and baseball bats.
The charges arising from the demonstration were participating in a riot and
violating his bail conditions from the Westmount protest-even though
these conditions were only supposed to apply in Westmount. The charge of
violating the Westmount conditions was eventually dropped, but in the
meantime he was released on conditions extending the Westmount
recognizance to all of Canada. At the time of his arrest in Quebec City,
neither the Westmount nor the G-20 charges had gone to trial, and both,
sets of conditions remained in place. However, the Crown prosecutor was
only aware of the Westmount conditions throughout Singh's bail hearing.127
At the end of his bail hearing, Singh was denied bail on the
secondary ground. In doing so, Justice Mercier relied on the hearsay
testimony of the police officer, whom he described as having personally
seen Singh directing the riot.128 The court dismissed the direct evidence of
a witness who was involved in constructing and directing the catapult and
who testified that Singh had nothing whatsoever to do with the catapult that
was designed to throw teddy bears. 29 Then, having described the statutory
provisions providing for the denial of bail as exceptions to the presumption
of innocence, 30 Mr. Justice Mercier gave the following reasons for ordering
Singh to be remanded into custody:
An accused who, on May 2, 2000, a little less than a year ago, undertook before a tribunal
to not participate in any-I will use the precise terms here-to not participate in any
demonstration on public property unless that demonstration is peaceable and lawful. So I
have just one question. An individual who, after having entered into such an undertaking,
and who then does not respect it, how can he convince the court that if he is released he will
respect any conditions that the Court should impose? 3 '
Armed with a transcript demonstrating that the conditions he was
charged with breaching were only to apply in Westmount, Singh intended
to request a bail review of the decision to deny him bail. When the Crown
prosecutor discovered the G-20 conditions, he agreed to allow Singh to
have a new bail hearing on the condition that charges for breaching the G-
127 Singh, supra note 77.
1 28  c. Singh (26 Avril 2001), Quebec 200-01-062331-016, 200-01-062332-014 (C.Q.) [Singh 2b]
at 23 (Transcript of Decision at Show Cause Hearing).
1 29 Singh 2a, supra note 120 at 94-97.
130 Singh 2b, supra note 128 at 54.
131 Ibid. at 57-58 [translated by author].
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20 conditions be substituted for the charge of breaching the Westmount
conditions. Singh was released at the end of the second bail hearing on the
G-20 conditions with the following additions: he was prohibited from using
a megaphone in Canada and prohibited from being a leader. The saga does
not end there. After Singh made a speech at an anti-war demonstration-
using a microphone-he was charged both with violating his condition that
he not use a megaphone and that he not be a leader. Currently Singh is
facing approximately six different charges for breaching bail conditions.
13 2
These examples demonstrate the dangers of imposing bail
conditions limiting political activity as well as the way that they can
accumulate against an activist who refuses to curb his political work. An
arrest at a demonstration leads to a bail condition limiting participation in
future protests including lawful ones. It may be arguable that such a
condition represents a reasonable response to an activist arrested for
carrying out civil disobedience. However, Singh's presence at another
demonstration lead to another arrest, and so on, until he is now prohibited
from carrying out activities that are otherwise completely lawful and
beyond reproach. The criminalization of dissent, and the attack on
movement leadership, could not be more explicit than it is for Jaggi Singh.
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT AND
TERRORISM
The global justice movement is raising important questions about
democracy and equality, both globally and locally. Because activists believe
that there are no legitimate democratic processes through which they can
express their opposition to neo-liberalism, global justice activists have
created their own sources of political power through mass mobilization.
Civil disobedience is one of the tactics used by the movement to interfere
with the ability of powerful states to carry forward the neo-liberal agenda.
The current public debate about the merits of free trade, neo-liberalism,
and their effects can be attributed to the organizing efforts of the
movement as a whole.
One of the major obstacles the movement faces in pushing forward
its (sometimes contradictory) vision for global justice, is the criminalization
of political activity such as association and assembly. The bail system has
played a significant role in this disturbing trend. When protesters are
arrested at demonstrations in which civil disobedience occurs, they are
invariably released on conditions that limit their ability to participate in
132 Singh, supra note 77.
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political activity. These conditions-which include requirements to keep
the peace and be of good behaviour, to leave any demonstration that
becomes non-peaceable or unlawful, or to avoid association with militant
political organizations-are so broadly stated that they include almost any
collective political action. Thus activity that is so crucial for a free and
democratic society that it is protected by the Charter, such as political
expression or assembly, becomes unlawful. Breaches of these sorts of
conditions can lead to the imposition of even stricter conditions. Where
activists charged with breaching bail conditions are perceived as movement
leaders, they are at risk of being denied bail, often in violation of the
presumption of innocence.
It is noteworthy that all of the case studies refer to events that took
place before the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11,
2001. In the uncertain times that followed that tragic event, concerns were
expressed by many that the space available for exercising important civil
and political rights would contract. These concerns were compounded, in
the Canadian context, by the hasty passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act. t33
Although the men who piloted the planes into the World Trade Centre
seem a world apart from the youthful activists filling the streets of Quebec
City, the kinds of demonstrations and tactics that have characterized the
global justice movement are not excluded from the ambit of the new Act.
Rather, it appears that the Act has been specifically designed to capture
them.
The new definition of "terrorist activity" is the most important
section of the Act, since it dictates the application of all of the other
provisions. Section 83.01(1) provides that "terrorist activity" includes:
an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
(i) that is committed
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose,
objective or cause, and
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a
segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its
economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic
or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act,
whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside
or outside Canada, and
(ii) that intentionally
133Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41. For an analysis of the new legislation see the collection of
essays in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, The Security of Freedom: Essays on
Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence,
(B) endangers a person's life,
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any
segment of the public,
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private
property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or
harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential
service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a
result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not
intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses
(A) to (C).
134
This definition is extraordinarily broad and includes many of the tactics
used by global justice activists.'35 The statement "an act committed for a
political purpose with the intention of compelling a government or an
international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, with the
added intention of causing a serious disruption" could be a definition of
terrorist activity within the Act or a definition of the actions of the
protesters who marched in Quebec City to pressure Summit participants
into changing their approach to the global economy. In fact, the legislative
definition of terrorist activity is broad enough to capture many different
kinds of political activity, including many of the tactics used historically by
the labour movement.1
36
The global justice movement is traversing a different political and
legal terrain, the full consequences of which it is still too early to discern.
However, the political context is such that it is likely that the trends
observed in the law of bail as it applies to activists will continue without
serious opposition. There is also the possibility that attacks on civil and
political rights through the bail system could become worse as the state
makes use of the new tools it has at its disposal, including new reverse onus
provisions for terrorist offences, preventive detentions, and peace bond
provisions. 
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134 Criminal Code, supra note 27 at s. 83.01(1)(b).
135 David Schneiderman & Brenda Cossman, "Political Association and the Anti-Terrorism Bill"
in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's
Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 175.
13 6 Ibid. at 180-81.
137 For a description of the scope of these powers, see Gary Trotter, "The Anti-Terrorism Bill and
Preventive Restraints on Liberty" in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach,supra note 135
at 239.
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The Canadian state-through the police, government, and
judiciary-has made the choice to treat political protest and dissent as a
criminal matter. This reinforces, at least for social justice activists, the
precedence of the rights of corporations and foreign dictators visiting
Canada. Given the importance of the issues raised by the global justice
movement, the tactics employed to suppress dissent must seriously call into
question the state of democracy in Canada.

